|
||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||
The Battle of Langemarck was the second big British attack of the Third Battle of Ypres of the First World War. The battle took place in the Ypres Salient area of the Western Front, between 16 and 18 August 1917.
Contents |
Ground conditions during the whole Ypres-Passchendaele action were bad because the ground was already fought-over and was partially flooded. Continuous shelling had destroyed drainage canals in the area and unseasonable heavy rain in August turned areas into a sea of mud and water-filled shell-craters. The troops walked up to the front on duckboards laid across the mud, often carrying up to one hundred pounds (45 kg) of equipment. It was possible for them to slip off the path into the craters and drown before they could be rescued. The trees were reduced to blunted trunks, the branches and leaves torn away and the bodies of men buried after previous actions were often uncovered by the rain and shelling.
Fifth army headquarters was influenced by the effect that delay would have on the coastal operation, which needed the high tides at the end of August or it would have to be postponed for a month.[1] Gough delayed the general offensive for a day but then a thunderstorm on the 14th forced another 24 hour postponement.
Intended for 9 August, (after several rain delays) to prepare the way for the general offensive due on 13 August (which eventually began on 16 August) but delayed for 24 hours by a thunderstorm on the 8th (with 10mm of rain, after the 25mm which fell between 1 and 4 August),[2] II Corps attacked on the 10th to capture the rest of the 'black line' not taken or held on 31 July. British artillery fire was distributed across the battlefront for the general attack by II, XIX and XVIII Corps on the 'green line', (slightly beyond the German Wilhelm (third) Line between Polygon Wood and Langemarck) while the Germans concentrated their artillery on the II and XIX Corps fronts. British counter-battery efforts were hampered by the adverse weather, which made air observation extremely difficult so much of the effort was wasted by inaccurate fire and an inability to see German artillery shifting position (among three or four alternative emplacements per battery). The state of the ground, German artillery fire and British artillery losses foreshadowed the situation in late October opposite Passchendaele Ridge.[3] 8th and 30th Divisions were relieved by 25th and 18th Divisions by 4 August but delays caused by the weather meant that despite reliefs every 48 hours for the front-line troops, they were exhausted by the 10th. The advance succeeded but German artillery fire and infantry counter-attacks isolated the British infantry of 18th Division, which had captured Glencorse Wood and about 7 p.m. German infantry behind a smokescreen recaptured all but the north-west corner of the Wood. Only 25th Division's gains on Westhoek Ridge were held.[4]By 14 August these divisions had been relieved by 56th Division on the right and 8th Division on the left.[5]
II Corps's objective was still the 'green' line of 31 July and on the 56th Division front this was about 500 yards into Polygon Wood; the 53rd Brigade of 18th Division was kept in line and attached to the division. The 8th Division GOC, Major-General Heneker had written to Jacob the II Corps commander on 12 August, urging that the 56th Division should attack before the 8th Division with extra artillery support, because the ground in front of the line held by II Corps sloped down from the north of Menin Road to the Hanebeek valley. Failure on the right would expose troops further north to cross-fire from Inverness Copse and Glencorse Wood. This suggestion was not accepted but 56th Division had been given the 53rd Brigade from 18th Division the day before.[7]
On the right, 53rd brigade was to advance from Stirling Castle, through Inverness Copse to Black Watch Corner (the south western corner of Polygon Wood), forming a defensive flank to the south. Further north 169th Brigade was to advance to Polygon Wood through Glencorse Wood and 167th Brigade was to reach the northwestern part of Polygon Wood through Nonne Bosschen.[8] 8th Division was to attack with two brigades between Westhoek and the Ypres-Roulers railway, 25th Brigade on the right and 23rd Brigade up to the railway, to the 'green' line on the rise east of the Hanebeek stream.[9]
At 04.45 a.m. a creeping barrage began and the British troops advanced. German flares were seen rising but the German artillery response was slow and missed the attackers. German machine-gun fire from pill-boxes (which were immune to field artillery fire) caused heavy losses to 53rd Brigade which was stopped in front of the north west corner of Inverness Copse. Part of the brigade managed to work forward further north and form a defensive flank on the southern edge of Glencorse Wood. 169th Brigade advanced quickly at the start but veered to their right to avoid boggy ground and then entered Glencorse Wood. The main resistance by the Germans took place in a sunken road in the wood. After a hard-fought engagement, with high losses to both sides the German defenders were overcome and the rest of the wood occupied. The leading waves then advanced to Polygon Wood.[10] 167th Brigade had a fast start, then when it reached the north end of Nonne Bosschen found more mud, four feet deep and veered round it to the left; this meant that the gap which had formed between it and 169th Brigade was not closed. Another problem emerged because the quick start had been partly caused by German shelling on the left of the brigade, which led to the rear waves pushing up to avoid it, bunching and not mopping up the captured ground; Germans there began sniping at both brigades. Part of a company reached the area north of Polygon Wood at about the same time as small numbers of troops from 8th division.[11] The ground conditions in the 56th Division area were so bad that none of the tanks in support got into action, all bogging down.[12]
8th Division's two attacking brigades started well, behind an 'admirable' barrage and reached the Hanebeek where hand bridges were used to cross it and continue the advance up Anzac spur to the 'green' line objectives on the ridge beyond. Difficulties began on the left flank, where troops fron 16th Division had not kept up with 8th Division. After reaching an area containing Potsdam Redoubt a little later, the 16th Division was held up for the rest of the day. German machine-gunners north of the railway were free to enfilade the area of 8th Division to the south. On the right flank the same thing happened as 56th Division ran into trouble from the German defenders in their area and heavy fire from German artillery batteries concentrated to the south-east. After a long fight, 8th Division captured Iron Cross, Anzac and Zonnebeke redoubts on the rise beyond the Hanebeek then sent parties over the ridge.[13]
XIX Corps had serious difficulties like II Corps in preparing its attack (north of the Ypres-Roulers railway to just south of St Julien) on the objectives of 16th and 36th divisions, a mile up Anzac and Zonnebeke spurs near the Wilhelm (third) Line. From 1—15 August the divisions had lost about a third of their front-line strength in casualties when holding ground from 4 August in the Hanebeek and Stenbeek valleys which were overlooked by the Germans, after providing carrying parties since the last week in July. Frequent reliefs had spread the casualties to all of the battalions in both divisions. The advance began on time and after a few hundred yards encountered German strong points which had not been destroyed before the attack by a series of heavy artillery shoots.[14]
16th Division had heavy losses from the Germans in Potsdam, Vampire and Borry farms, because the infantry shortage was so bad that these positions were not mopped up. The garrisons were able to shoot at the advancing British troops of 48th Brigade from behind. Nonetheless isolated parties of British troops reached their objectives. The 49th Brigade on the left was also held up by Borry Farm and several costly attacks failed to capture it. The left of the brigade got as far as 400 yards from the top of Hill 37. [15]
36th Division also struggled to advance. Gallipoli and Somme farms were behind a new wire entanglement, which had German machine-guns trained on the gaps made by the British bombardment, stopping the advance of 108th Brigade. To the north, 109th Brigade had to get across the swamp astride the Steenbeek but it took too long, the infantry lost the barrage and were stopped by fire from Pond farm and Border House. On the left troops got to Fortuin, about 400 yards from the start line.[16]
The advance further north was much more successful. XVIII Corps (48th and 11th Divisions) retook and held St Julien and the area south east of Langemarck while XIV Corps (20th and 29th Divisions) captured Langemarck and the Wilhelm (third) Line north of the Ypres-Staden railway near the Kortebeek. The French First Army conformed, pushing up to the Kortebeek and St Jansbeck stream west of the northern stretch of the Wilhelm (third) Line where it crossed to the east side of the Kortebeek, taking Poesele and Drie Grachten.[17]
The troops of 169th Brigade, 56th Division which tried to follow the leading waves from Glencorse Wood were stopped at the edge of Polygon Wood then pushed back by a counter-attack by the German 34th Division around 07.00 a.m., the troops ahead of them being overwhelmed. The brigade was driven back later in the afternoon to its start line by German attacks from the south and east by troops from a regiment of the 54th Division sent back into the line.[18] 167th Brigade pulled back its right flank as 169th Brigade was seen withdrawing through Glencorse Wood and at 3.00 p.m. the Germans attacked the front of 167th Brigade and the 25th Brigade (8th Division) to the north. The area was under British artillery observation and stopped by artillery fire. At 5.00 p.m. the brigade withdrew to a better position only 400 yards in front of its start line to gain touch with 25th Brigade.[19] German artillery fired continuously on a line from Stirling Castle to Westhoek, intensely from noon to isolate the attacking British batallions from reinforcements and supplies and support the counter-attack in the afternoon.[20]
As the German counter-attacks by 34th Division on 56th Division gained ground, 8th Division to the north, about 1,000 yards ahead of the divisions on the flanks[21] found itself enfiladed, as predicted by the GOC before the offensive. About 09.30 a.m. reinforcements for 27th Reserve Regiment, 54th Division from the local Eingreif division, (34th Regiment, 3rd Reserve Division) attacked over Anzac Farm spur. SOS calls from the British infantry were not seen by their artillery observers due to low cloud[22] and smoke shell being fired by the Germans into their creeping barrage. Air observation from a British aircraft failed to give enough information to help the artillery, which didn't fire until too late at 10.15 a.m. The German counter-attack pressed the right flank of 25th Brigade, which was being fired on from recaptured positions in Nonne Bosschen and forced it back, exposing the right of the 23rd Brigade (already being pressed on its left flank) to the north, which fell back slowly to the Hanebeek stream. Another German attack at 3.45 p.m. was also not engaged by the British artillery as the mist and rain obscured the SOS signal from the infantry. The Germans 'dribbled' forward and gradually pressed the British infantry back to the foot of Westhoek Ridge.[23] By evening both brigades of the 8th Division withdrew from German enfilade fire from the 56th Division area to just forward of their start line.[24]
At around 09.00 a.m. 16th and 36th Divisions were counter-attacked by the reserve regiment of 5th Bavarian Division supported by part of the 12th Reserve (Eingreif) division behind a huge barrage. Again, the Germans used smoke shell to mask the attack from British artillery observers. Despite 'ideal' weather, air observation here failed as it did on II Corps's front. The forward elements of both divisions were overrun and killed or captured.[25] By 10.15 a.m. Watts, the Corps commander felt obliged to bring the barrage back to the start-line, regardless of any survivors holding out beyond it. At 2.08 p.m. Fifth Army HQ ordered that a line from Borry Farm to Hill 35 and Hindu Cottage be taken to link with XVIII Corps but after consulting the divisional commanders Watts reported that a renewed attack was impossible since the reserve brigades were already holding the start line.[26]
There were few German counter-attacks on the front of XVIII and XIV Corps, which had also not been subjected to much artillery fire before the attack as the Germans had concentrated on the corps further south. Despite the 'worst going' in the salient the 48th division got forward on its left, depite being hampered by fire from the area not occupied by 36th Division on its right; 11th Division got beyond Langemarck. 20th and 29th Divisions of XIV Corps and the French to their north reached most of their objectives without serious counter-attack by the Germans who subjected the new positions to much artillery fire instead, inflicting heavy losses for several days, especially on 20th Division.[27]
In the II and XIX Corps areas the result of II Corps's attack of 10 August had been repeated, with the infantry being isolated by German artillery and then (except for small areas on the left of 56th division, the flanks of 8th Division and right of 16th Division)[28] forced back to their start line by German machine-gun fire from the flanks and infantry counter-attacks which were well supported by artillery. Attempts by the German infantry to advance further were stopped by British artillery fire inflicting heavy losses.[29] The GOC 56th Division later reported that lack of time to prepare the attack and study the ground, (167th Brigade had relieved part of the 25th Division after it had only been in the line for 24 hours, thus neither unit had enough time to make preparations) no tracks beyond Chateau Wood and the wet ground had slowed the delivery of supplies to the front line and obstructed the advance beyond it; pill-boxes had cause more delay and subjected the attacking troops to frequent enfliade fire before they were captured, which was not always possible.<ref.Bax & Boraston, ibid, p. 153.</ref> Tank support intended to help capture pill-boxes had failed due to them bogging down behind the British front-line. Air support had ben restricted by the weather, particularly low cloud early on and by giving too few aircraft over the battlefield too many things to do; only one aircraft per corps was on counter-attack patrol, with two aircraft per division for ground attack and eight aircraft on the whole army front to engage German infantry as they counter-attacked.[30] Signals had failed at vital moments, depriving the infantry of their artillery support and all this had made the German counter-attacks much more effective in areas where their artillery observation was good. The division recommended that advances be shortened to minimise the organisational and communication difficulties caused by the ground and weather to give more time for consolidation.[31]
Nonetheless Ludendorff's verdict was less sanguine,
The rain, bombardments and British air attacks also undermined the fighting power of the Germans who had not become casualties.[36]
Exploiting observation from higher ground to the east, the German divisions (5th Bavarian (Eingreif), 34th, 214th, 3rd Reserve, 119th, 183rd, 32nd, 9th Bavarian Reserve, 204th, 54th, 12th Reserve (Eingreif), 26th Reserve, 79th Reserve (Eingreif), 26th and 26th Reserve)[37] were able to inflict heavy losses on the British divisions holding the new line beyond Langemarck. After two fine dry days on 17 and 18 August, XIX and XVIII Corps began pushing closer to the German Wilhelm (third) Line. On 20 August an operation by British tanks, artillery and infantry captured strongpoints along the St Julien – Poelkappelle road and on 22 August larger gains were made (despite the tank support mostly ditching behind the British front line) by XVIII and XIX Corps, which still left them overlooked by the Germans in the uncaptured part of the Wilhelm (third) Line, from east of Langemarck south to the Ypres – Zonnebeke road.[38]
II Corps resumed operations to capture Nonne Bosschen and Glencorse Woods and Inverness Copse north of the Menin Road on 22 August, the Copse and Herenthage Park being the first objective. The German outpost line was on the western edge of the Copse about 600 yards west of the Albrecht (second) Line. The 14th (Light) Division with some tanks forced the German defenders back to the Albrecht (third) line at the Herenthage Chateau, with heavy losses to both sides. The 90 British troops not casualties were forced back by a German counter-attack to the western edge of the Copse. Next morning the German 34th Division made a second counter-attack which collided with the two British tanks still operational of five sent to attack German strong points in Inverness Copse. The counter-attack melted away. At 6.00 a.m. on the 23rd, after a German hurricane bombardment fell on them in the Copse, the German infantry advanced, reached the western edge of the Copse then fell back, still under fire from German artillery. Another attempt in the afternoon, under a hail of fire from both artilleries, pushed the British out of the Copse and eventually a British counter-attack was cancelled, due to uncertainty about the position of the front line. The British general offensive intended for 27 August was changed because of this failure to hold ground, then postponed due to more bad weather.[39]
British casualties for 31 July to 28 August are given as 68,010 by the British Official Historian; 10,266 being killed,[40] with a claim that 37 German divisions had been exhausted and withdrawn.
In view of the failure of the British Fifth Army to advance very far during August, Haig decided to transfer more of the weight of the offensive towards the south-east along the southern half of Passchendaele Ridge.[41] Haig gave principal authority for the offensive to the British Second Army under command of General Herbert Plumer on 25 August. Like Gough after 32 July, Plumer abandoned attempts to exploit opportunities created by the 'bite' part of the operation and instead intended to launch several attacks, each with even more limited geographical objectives, to ensure that the infantry were organised on tactically advantageous ground and in contact with their artillery when they received German counter-attacks.[41]